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Comment on The Plain English Movement
David S. Cohen *

On first impression, the private and social benefits of plain
English contracts and perhaps of plain English legislation seem
obvious. Theoretically, by using contracts drafted in simple
language we may increase consumer comprehension of
contractual terms, engender more accurate contract decisionmaking, and promote more precise pricing of contract goods.
Perhaps consumers who understand their contractual obligations
will be more likely to fulfil them. Commercial goodwill may
flower, and the use of plain English contracts has been advertised
as a selling tool.' This approach to plain English, which reflects
the views of Mr. Felsenfeld, fails to address or to analyze
thoroughly several major assumptions and implications of plain
English contracts.
The purpose of this comment is to demonstrate that plain
Assistant Professor of Law, University of British Columbia.
argument has been made that the voluntary decision by many commercial enterprises to adopt plain English contracts is a thinly disguised attempt to increase their
respective market shares. See Black, "A Model Plain Language Law"; 33 Stan. L. Rev.
255 (1981), at pp. 263-4.

1 The
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English contracts may carry more risks than benefits; the
approach may, in fact, present a regressive stage in the evolution
of consumer law. The reasons for this decidedly negative
appraisal are as follows. First, plain English contracts and legislation are not the only vehicles for achieving increased information access in consumer contracting. Plain English should not be
evaluated in the abstract, but must be assessed on a relative basis
with these alternative tools. Second, because plain English
contracts use the process of market transfer to encourage information flow, the result may be a disproportionate level of benefits
being received by a limited, select group of consumers. Third,
plain English legislation, as Mr. Felsenfeld admits, has focused
on simplicity of language which may not bring about a concomitant reduction in the complexity of contracts. A consideration of
the amount of information which we attempt to include in
consumer contracts reveals that simplicity of language is not
enough. A related point is that there are more than two actors
involved in contract drafting; the judiciary which will be interpreting the contracts, and lawyers who will be redrafting and
interpreting these contracts are left out of the equation by plain
English proponents. It is my view that subsidiary reforms must
also take place in the approach and method of judicial interpretation. A fourth concern with the plain English movement is that it
reintroduces a concept of contract as a bilateral event rather than
a multilateral process, focusing judicial attention on a discrete,
simple document, with the possible result that the reality of
consumer decision-making may become less relevant to a determination of legal rights. My fifth concern reflects a cynical but
realistic appraisal of the likelihood that any amelioration of
consumer contracts will come about as a result of the plain
English movement.. The conceptual complexity of a great deal of
contractual information, the difficulty of inter-contract comparisons of the value of various mixes of price and non-price terms,
and the contracting process itself, persuade me that all that will
result is the transfer of paper bearing simple language. It is
unlikely that there will be a corresponding transfer of information, and even less likely that this information will be processed,
analyzed and used in the transactional process.
My first concern relates to any evaluation of plain English legislation which fails to take into account both the existing vehicles
for increasing access to information in the consumer transactional
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process, and such alternative methods of achieving that end as
may not yet be in place. While Canadian law does not now enjoy
plain English legislation it is arguable that common law and
statutory doctrines of unconscionability which focus on procedural dysfunction in the contracting process2, and judicially
crafted concepts of reasonable notice of unusual or onerous
contract terms3 may be applied to afford relief to consumers who
apparently bind themselves to poorly drafted, archaically
worded, inordinately complex consumer contracts containing
unusual and substantively onerous terms. At the same time the
potential threat of the application of these doctrines provides an
economic incentive to suppliers of consumer goods and services
to introduce clarity into their contractual documents. In addition,
provincial trade practice legislation regulating deceptive
marketing and selling techniques is drafted in broad enough
terms to afford relief to consumers who are misled, or are likely
to be misled4 when faced with contractual and extra-contractual5
Leff, "Unconscionability and the Code - the Emperor's New Clause", 115 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 485 (1967); M. J. Trebilcock, "An Economic Approach to Unconscionability" in
B. J. Reiter and J. Swan, Studies in Contract Law (Toronto, Butterworths 1980), Study
11, p. 379. See American Home Improvement Inc. v. Maclver, 201 A. 2d 886 (use of
terms so obtuse and archaic that a layman is not capable of understanding them). Article
2-316 of the Uniform Commercial Code adopts a similar approach in requiring certain
exclusion clauses to be conspicuous in order to be enforced. Legislative intervention in
several provinces supports the view that the statutory doctrine of unconscionability will
include judicial review of the contract process, and of the consumer's ability to understand the agreement. See the Business Practices Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 55, s. 2(b)(i);
Trade Practice Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406, s. 4(2)(b); the Unfair Trade Practices Act,
R.S.A. 1 9 8 0 , ~U-3,
.
s. 4(l)(b); the Trade Practices Act, S. Nfld. 1 9 7 8 , ~ 10,
. s. 6(1)(n.
See Tilden Rent-A-Car Co. v. Clendenning (1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 400,18 0.R. (2d) 601
(C.A.); R. Hasson, "The Unconscionability Business - A Comment On Tilden RentA-Car Co. v. Clendenning", 3 C.B.L.J. 193 (1979).
4Trade Practice Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406, s. 3(1); the Business Practices Act, R.S.O.
1980, c. 55, s. 2(a); The Unfair Trade Practices Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. U-3, s. 4(l)(d). See
Director of Trade Practices v. Household Finance Corp. of Can. (1977), 33 C.P.R. (2d)
284, [I9771 3 W.W.R. 390 (B.C.C. A.). In Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties
Inc., 365 A. 2d 442 the argument was made that technical and archaic language violated
a state statutory prohibition against "any other fraudulent conduct which creates a
likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding".
By "extra-contractual" I mean to say that trade practice legislation has discarded the
common law distinction between contract terms and representations which do not give
rise to contractual liability. Generally, the legislation refers to representations, that is,
statements which influence consumer decision-making. While the details of the legislation differ from province to province, the legislation is uniform in so far as it discards
the contractlnon-contract distinction. See Belobaba, "Unfair Trade Practices Legislation: Symbolism and Substance in Consumer Protection", 15 Osgoode Hall L.J. 327
(1977), at pp. 336-7.
2
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representations which are deceptively drafted. The point to be
made is that plain English may not be necessary or appropriate in
all consumer contracts. In addition, trade practice legislation
recognizes that contract is not bilateral, and accordingly the legislation regulates deceptive practices of all enterprises which disseminate information to consumer^.^ Finally, common law
doctrines of unconscionability and reasonable notice permit a
flexibility of application which statutory plain English legislation
may not. Any evaluation of plain English contracts and legislation must assess the benefits of the movement against these
existing tools.
More importantly, the plain English movement must be
evaluated against an approach which will provide consumers with
comparative information about consumer products, services, and
contract terms prior to the time at which their decision to enter
into the transaction becomes effectively irrevocable. If we are
concerned with consumer transactional decision-making, which
of necessity will involve significant search costs, we ought to be
providing comparative data of price and other primary contract
terms.' At the very least we might consider structuring our legal
The legislative philosophy which becomes apparent on close examination is that traditional contract analysis, which focuses on a bilateral event is an overly simplistic and
unrealistic model in reflecting legal relationships. See Goldberg, "Toward an Expanded
Economic Theory of Contract", 10 J. of Econ. Issues 45 (1976), at pp. 49-52; Macneil,
"Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a 'Rich
Classificatory Apparatus"', 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1018 (1981); Macneil, Contracts:
Exchange Transactions and Relations, 2d ed. (1978). The concept of contractual relations
as distinguished from discrete events may reflect, as well, a view of decision-making as
multilateral negotiations. In the consumer context, this would recognize that expectations, influence and remedial behaviour, both legal and non-legal in form, exist between
consumers and direct suppliers, distributors, advertisers, individual sales employees and
manufacturing enterprises. The legislation explicitly recognizes this perspective in
severely limiting the traditional contract doctrine of vertical privity. Belobaba, supra,
footnote 5 at pp. 340-1. See Trade Practice Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406, s. 1 (definition of
supplier); the Unfair Business Practices Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. U-3, s. l(h) (definition of
supplier).
7 This is one of the services provided by consumer organizations in Canada and the United
States. See R. A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 2nd ed. (Toronto, Little, Brown &
Co., 1977), p. 84. An example of this comparative information is The Standard Cox Life
Insurance Tables, which is a compilation of life insurance premium price data. (See The
Globe and Mail (Toronto, December 10, 1979).) The Quebec government has for
several years funded a popular consumer magazine (Protegez-vous) with a circulation of
several 100,000 which provides comparative data on numerous consumer products and
services. The provision of information about one product, without comparative information, simply does not permit the consumer to make an informed decision to choose more

6
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system to promote the private investment necessary to acquire,
collect, evaluate and distribute that information prior to
contracting. Perhaps comparative information will not be
provided either by suppliers of goods or by private organizations
organized for that p ~ r p o s eIf. ~that is so, then we might seriously
contemplate providing information about available contractual
offerings out of public funds. Plain English contracts appear, at
least on first impression, to be a terribly inefficient vehicle for
reinforcing inter-contractual comparison of contractual terms.
My point again is simply that plain English legislation must be
evaluated on a relative basis with full appreciation of the benefits
of existing approaches and potential alternatives.
My second criticism of plain English legislation and contracts is
a response to the presumption underlying the movement that
~ are repeatedly referred to
consumers are h o m o g e n e o ~ s .We
"the consumers", all of whom stand to benefit from the redesign
and redrafting of contracts, and all of whom apparently will
benefit equally. The truth of the matter is far more complex.
Purchasers of some kinds of consumer goods and services may be
drawn from articular socio-economic classes. Some consumers
have little orLnoeducation, others have business experience, and
still others have law degrees. Research bears out one's intuitive
impression that the plain English movement may benefit a
certain, limited class of consumers who are highly motivated to
acauire information. assess contractual risks and take those risks
into account when making purchase decisions.1° These consumers
o r less of the desired good (whether that "good" is safety, durability, contractual
remedies on breach, service facilities, notice terms o r any other legal right set out in the
contractual document) which will be recognized by the court. An alternative approach is
to provide "labelling" information which depicts the relevant quality of a product, on a
relative basis. Hirschhorn, Product Safety Regulation and the Hazardous Products Act,
Technical Report No. 10, Economic Council of Canada (1981), at pp. 77-8.
8The reasons for this non-disclosure range from the "public good" nature of a great deal
of consumer information, market instability giving rise to a "high information depreciation rate", the private costs of disclosure to the supplier, and non-competitive
marketing environments. See Trebilcock, supra, footnote 2 at p. 409; Posner, supra,
footnote 7 at pp. 80-4.
9 A similar argument may be made on the side of commercial enterprise. Plain language
legislation may have a disproportionate impact on small businesses which may be
carrying on business in a very competitive environment. Leete, "Plain Language Legislation: A Comparison of Approaches", 18 Am. Bus. L. J. 511 (1981), at p. 517.
lo I admit, of course, that, in theory, the behaviour of this segment of the market may
influence the contract terms available to non-marginal consumers. See text at footnotes
69 to 72, infra.
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may in fact be those who would have been most likely to benefit
from contractual information presented in traditional contract
form." Thus, the distributive consequences of the approach may
be less than satisfying. If one assumes that all or some of the
costsI2 of the plain English movement are passed on to all
consumers as part of the price of the consumer good, a large
sector of the public may unwittingly be subsidizing benefits
received by a small, elite sub-class of consumers. The evidence
suggests that, while lower socio-economic classes may stand to
gain more from disclosure of information than other groups
(since arguably they begin with less information), disclosure laws
may in fact worsen the relative position of the poor. Such laws,
instead of reducing the gap between rich and poor, may operate
to give a net advantage to the "average" consumer.13 The explanation for the potential discriminatory impact of plain English
and disclosure laws includes the fact that the poor may be disadvantaged to the extent that their particular background information, relative ability to process conceptual information, and
educational levels may distort their comprehension of decidedly
complex contractual terms.14 In addition, income disadvantages
may play a significant role in the ability of the poor to invest in
search costs necessary to evaluate transactional information on a
comparative basis. Finally, the poor may suffer from market
segregation in "contract terms",15 similar to the segmentation of
11 Davis,

"Protecting Consumers From Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook: An Empirical
Look at the Simplification of Consumer Credit-Contracts", 63 Va. L. Rev. 841 (1977),
at pp. 842, 844; National Commission on Consumer Finance, Consumer Credit in the
United States, (1972), at pp. 176-7.
l 2 These costs, while likely to be of a capital nature, are not insignificant. Virtually every
description of plain English legislation stresses the inordinate amount of time, effort and
money invested in redrafting consumer contracts. Experts from several disciplines are
necessarily involved in the process, and the drafting process must take into account not
only business risks and evaluation of legal consequences, but also language, syntax,
style, sentence structure and length, format, colour and numerous other variables. See
Black, "A Model Plain Language Law", supra, footnote 1 at p. 260.
13McNeil, "Market Discrimination Against the Poor and the Impact of Consumer
Disclosure Laws: The Used Car Industry", 13 Law & Soc. Rev. 695 (1979), at pp. 697701; Ganvood, "A Look at Truth in Lending -Five Years After", 14 Sant. CI. L. Rev.
491 (1974), at pp. 500-3.
l 4 Davis, supra, footnote 11 at pp. 847-56; Schroder, Driver and Streufort, Human
Information Processing (1967), pp. 109-15; Andreasen and Best, "Consumer Response
to Unsatisfactory Purchases: A Survey of Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints, and
Obtaining Redress", 11Law & Soc. Rev. 701 (1977).
15 See Leff, "Contract as Thing", 19 Am. U.L. Rev. 131 (1970). In this essay, the contract
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product markets along income lines. Research suggests that
markets which serve a disproportionately high concentration of
low income consumers may provide lower quality goods, exhibit
less competition and perhaps have more marginal sellers than
other markets.16 It is reasonable to suppose that the contractual
terms distributed in these markets may be similarly skewed. If so,
plain English legislation may simply represent a net gain to
middle income consumers. Like so much consumer protection
legislation and initiatives, the movement may benefit only those
members of the special interest groups which support it.
The third point which must be raised in any assessment of the
plain English movement is the scale against which one measures
simplicity. As Mr. Felsenfeld and others have pointed out, a
central object of the New York Plain English law has been to
improve "readability".17 This itself poses some second order
decisions relating to the standard of readability against which
consumer contracts are to be measured,18 and relating to the
degree of sophistication with which one approaches the task of
improving readability, however we choose to define the term.
While arguments may be raised in favour of a vague New York
standard of readability, equally persuasive arguments may be
made to support an objective quantitative standard or scale
against which a particular contract is measured. Perhaps a
"reasonableness" standard coupled with legislatively crafted
criteria which the courts are directed to use when assessing a
particular contract is a more suitable approach.19 In view of my
later remarks, I do not consider the issue to be terribly important,
itself, as distinguished from the product distributed is viewed as a product bought by
consumers.
16See Schnapper, "Consumer Legislation and the Poor", 76 Yale L.J. 745 (1967);
Andreason, The Disadvantaged Consumer (1975), pp. 36-54.
l7 What is meant by readability is comprehension or understandability. This is the object
of the plain English movement, and apparently is the attribute which the various quantitative tests employed in assessing plain English contracts are designed to measure. The
New York legislation requires contracts to be "written in a clear and coherent manner
using words with common and everyday meanings": N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law, s. 5-702(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1980-81).
See Black, supra, footnote 1 at pp. 278-80. Apparently, General Motors has developed
a computer programme which assesses "readability". See Drafiing Documents in Plain
Language (Practising Law Institute, 1979), pp. 97-106; Redish, "Readability", ibid, pp.
163-4.
l9 Black, supra, footnote 1 at pp. 273-85. See 1980 N.J. Sess. Law Sew. 492 (West), c. 125,
ss. 2,lO.
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although on balance I concur with the view that a vague
"understandability" standard is apt to secure a more sensitive and
realistic approach to the drafting of these contracts than is an
objective standard.
My concern on this point relates rather to the emphasis placed
on readability, with a concomitant reduction in attention to and
emphasis on the issue of information load. An assumption underlying the New York plain English law is that information comprehension is maximized primarily by improving the readability of
consumer contracts. There can be little doubt that syntax,
grammatical structure, layout and design, colour, captions and
headings, sentence structure and length, the use of non-technical
language, and similar efforts to reduce obscurity of language are
necessary elements of a comprehensive information
programme.20As Mr. Felsenfeld points out, however, this is only
part of the battle. An important element in the redrafting of
consumer contracts is the elimination of content. This involves
the considerable risk that substantive legal rights will be affected
by this process of literary surgery. This risk is, none the less, a
necessary element in the plain English movement.
A number of studies have indicated that an individual's ability
to process information depends, to a significant degree, on the
amount of information which is presented to him for
a s ~ i m i l a t i o n Assuming
.~~
this to be true, how does plain English
legislation operate to reduce extraneous clauses and needless
clutter? Furthermore, if the legislation or approach does mandate
brevity, who is to decide what goes in and what comes out? The
answer, of course, is the supplier of the contract. Even'a
rudimentary understanding of the place of contractual documents
in contract law suggests that a reduction in contract terms will
take place in only one direction.
I begin with the thesis that one purpose of contract law is to
20 This

is not to say that plain English legislation ought to establish detailed rules for all
these variables. Connecticut apparently has attempted to do precisely that:,Pub. Act.
No. 79-532, s. 2(c), 1979 Conn. Pub. Acts 776.
21 See Davis, supra, footnote 11 at p. 846; Leete, supra, footnote 9 at p. 512; Whitford,
"The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer Transactions", [I9731 Wis. L.
Rev. 401; Forshey, "Plain English Contracts: The Demise of Legalese", 30 Bay. L.
Rev. 765 (1978). In Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U . S . 555, 568 (1980), the
court said that "MeaningFtl disclosure does not mean more disclosure. Rather, it
describes a balance between 'competing considerations of complete disclosure . . . and
the need to avoid [information overload]'."
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provide contracting parties with a judicially crafted standard form
contract,22and thus to reduce the transaction costs which would
otherwise be incurred in an attempt to anticipate and to provide
explicitly for all significant kinds of contractual risk. This
reduction in transaction costs, including the costs of identifying
the risks, negotiating the allocation of the risks, drafting the
document and perhaps enforcement, is complemented by the
argument that the common law or judicial rule will itself reflect
an efficient allocation of risk.23 Where the legal background
consisting of common law or statute law24 would, where the
contract is silent, allocate a particular risk to the consumer ( i . e . ,
where the judicial decision would favour the commercial enterprise) it is unlikely that a plain English contract would include
disclosure of this implicit risk allocation. It is equally unlikely that
a consumer would be aware of the contingency, and even if he
were, it is highly unlikely that he would be cognizant of the legal
allocation of risk. Possible reasons for a decision not to disclose
this allocation of risk are not difficult to identify. First, the private
costs of this "warning" of contractual risk will be borne entirely
by the seller. Second, disclosure of this risk may encourage
aggressive bargainers, once they have access to this information,
to attempt to bargain for a reallocation of risk to the commercial
enterprise. There is little reason to suspect that the latter will wish
to accept the contingency, or even to engage in the negotiations.
Finally, the supplier may point to the plain English interest of
brevity and simplicity as a reason for silence. Whatever the
reason, the result will be non-disclosure of material risks
allocated by the common law or statute to consumers. Thus, the
plain English movement, when assessed in light of these private
incentives towards material non-disclosure25 has serious implica22 See

Fuller and Eisenberg, Basic Contract Law, 3rd ed. (1972), pp. 89-103; Tullock, The
Logic of the Law (1971), pp. 35-47.
23 See text at footnotes 32,33, infra.
24 For example, the use of appropriate language in a contractual document will trigger the
operation of provincial sales legislation, or perhaps federal negotiable instruments law.
Legal concepts drawn from the general law outside the terms of a contractual document
cannot possibly be disclosed in the contract itself. This function of common law and
legislation was expressly recognized by the House of Lords in Ashington Piggeries Ltd.
v. Christopher Hill Ltd., [I9711 1 All E.R. 847 at p. 881 per Lord Diplock.
See Kronman, "Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts", 7 J . of
Leg. Studies 1 (1978); Posner, "Strict Liability: A Comment", 2 J. of Leg. Studies 205
(1973), at p. 211; Green and Moore, "Winter's Discontent: Market Failure and
Consumer Welfare", 82 Yale L.J. 903 (1973), at p. 907.
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tions. Plain English contracts which leave out information of
greater significance than the information which is put in, can only
lead to irrational decisions premised on the remaining
misleading, albeit simply put, i n f o r m a t i ~ n . ~ ~
If, on the other hand, prior common law decisions or statutes
would allocate a particular risk to the seller, common sense, or
rather self-interest, would demand that the supplier, very simply,
in very plain English, allocate that risk to the consumer. Thus,
plain English contracts which take into account information load
as well as simplicity will become vehicles for disclosing only those
risks which would otherwise be borne by the commercial enterprise. Mr. Felsenfeld has suggested that altruism and perhaps
commercial embarrassment will influence commercial enterprises
to refrain from the most excessive, visible abuses of this otherwise
inexorable process. Absent strong evidence of this former motive
in commercial practice, and in light of my later remarks regarding
the probability of any appreciable modification of consumer
behaviour, some other indicia to business of what terms ought to
be left out in the interests of improving comprehension may be
appropriate.
One commentator has pointed out that the use of a legal
concept such as a "security interest", or alternatively a decision
to remain silent, may be devices to describe extremely complex
sets of ideas and rules where the result called for by the legal
concept or silence is in accord with the "ordinary expectations
and experience" of consumers.27However, in a great many cases
consumers have no expectations as to the allocation of a great
majority of contractual risks. To ask the courts to engage in a
fruitless search for a fictional intention is not likely to produce a
rational outcome. In addition, there is a serious risk that what is
an "ordinary expectation and experience" must be derived at
least in part from prior law and previous contracts. The result
may be that traditional substantive allocations of risk will
continue unabated.
Another approach is to eliminate all information which is not
sufficiently valuable to justify the increased information load, and
Landers and Rohner, "A Functional Analysis of Truth in Lending", 26 U.C.L.A.
L. Rev. 711 (1979), at p. 730.
27 Procaccia, "Readable Insurance Policies: Judicial Regulation and Interpretation", 14
Is. L. Rev. 74 (1979).
26 See
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which is too complex to be communicated e f f e c t i ~ e l y .This
~~
approach, while attractive, necessitates a relatively precise calculation of the effect of an additional bit of information on human
decision-making. In addition, we are told that what is or is not
"valuable" is to be determined by assessing the likelihood that
the creditor will in fact rely on the legal right established by the
term in light of the impact of the occurrence of the contingency
on his business enterprise. If the term has rarely if ever been
relied upon in fact, it is termed non-essential and, therefore,
ought to be excluded in the interests of consumer comprehension
of the remaining terms. As a starting point, this definition of what
is "essential" fails to take into account that the occurrence of a
specific contingency may have an impact which varies with time,
economic conditions, cost of money, and with the severity of the
loss or damage suffered. Equally important, it fails to consider
what lawyers and judges will do with the contract if and when the
contingency does occur.29
Finally, I might add that terms which are unenforceable
, ~ which
~
are likely to be held
pursuant to provincial l e g i ~ l a t i o nor
unenforceable through the application of common law or
statutory principles of unconscionability and the like, must be
excluded from plain English contracts. Those terms not only add
to information load and thus reduce comprehension, they
actually reduce awareness of the actual allocation of responsibility in law.31It seems trite to say that a term which effectively
Davis, supra, footnote 11 at pp. 900-04. See Landers and Rohner, supra, footnote 26 at
pp. 723,734.
29 See text at footnotes 33 to 36, infra.
30 An obvious example would include a clause purporting to permit a secured creditor in
British Columbia to seize consumer goods, and to sue for the deficiency owing on the
debt obligation. See Chattel Mortgage Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 48, ss. 23, 25(1); Sale of
Goods on Condition Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 373, s. 19. Another instance of such a
clause would be an attempt to abrogate the implied conditions under sales legislation in
several provinces. See the Consumer Protection Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 87, s. 34; the
Consumer Protection Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. C200, s. 58 as amended; Sale of Goods Act,
. s. 20.
R.S.B.C. 1 9 7 9 , ~370,
31 The New York Plain Language law has not, apparently, eliminated this practice. See
Siegel, "Drafting Simplified Legal Documents" in Drafting Documents in Plain
Language (Practising Law Institute, 1979), p. 190. See Black, supra, footnote 1 at pp.
286-87. The point has been made that at least one province has enacted legislation which
establishes that the inclusion of such clauses is a violation of the Act, giving rise to the
imposition of a fine or a term of imprisonment. See the Consumer Products Warranties
Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. C-30, s. 7(2) as amended. It is possible that provincial trade
28
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misleads a consumer into believing that he is under a legal
obligation when he is not, or which purports to deny the existence
of legal rights which in law cannot be varied, directly contradicts
the object of the plain English movement, which is to facilitate
the processing of transactional information.
I referred earlier to the failure of the plain English movement
to consider fully the likely consequences of a judicial resolution of
a dispute where a plain English contract is either silent on a
private allocation of risk, or perhaps uses an ambiguous or
technical term. Economic theorists,32 and more recently the
courts in the application of d0ctrine,~3have adopted as an explicit
analytical tool the argument that where the contract is silent, the
court should allocate the risk to the party who could have avoided
the loss by taking appropriate preventive measures, or alternatively could have assumed the risk through liability insurance or
self-insurance, at the lower cost of the two parties. If one adopts
this analysis, silent consumer contracts will often result in an
allocation of risk to the commercial enterprise which is apt to
have more accurate information as to the risk, obtained at a lower
cost, and which can take advantage of economies of scale to
prevent or insure against the risk at a marginal cost lower than the
consumer's. If that is how the courts will resolve disputes in the
future, and I have no reason to believe that they will not, I
foresee substantial intrusions into the concept of brevity and
reduced information load, as more and more contingencies
~
time, and commercial
become "essential" or " ~ a l u a b l e ' over
enterprises are faced with absorbing the costs of silence which
may accompany efficient judicial allocations of risk.
Related to this issue is an appreciation of the risks inherent in
practice legislation which prohibits a term which leads a consumer into believing he does
not have rights where in fact he does, may afford relief in the case of "dishonest"
contract terms. See Trade Practice Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406, s. 3(3)(m);Consumer
Research and Evaluation Branch, Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, Product
Liability: Reflections on Legal Aspects of the Policy Issues (1980), pp. 17-18.
32 See MacKaay, "The Costliness of Information and Its Effect on the Analysis of Law" in
Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law,
Jacob S. Ziegel, ed. (Toronto, Canada Law Book Ltd., 1979), p. 135; Posner, supra,
footnote 7 at pp. 74-7; Demsetz, "When Does the Rule of Liability Matter", 1 J . of Leg.
Studies 12 (1972), at p. 28; Posner, "Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law", 46
U . Chi. L. Rev. 281 (1979), at p. 285.
33 See Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd., [I9801 1 All E.R. 556 (H.L.), at
p. 568per Lord Diplock; George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd. v. Finning Lock Seeds Ltd.,
[I9811 1 Lloyd's L. Rep. 476 at p. 480.
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the application of traditional canons of contractual construction.
Much of the existing complexity of contracts results from the
quite rational response of draftsmen to adverse judicial decisions
based upon distorted and artificial meanings attributed to
contractual terms.34 If one expects commercial enterprises to
simplify their contractual documents, and to bear the entire risk
of any resulting ambiguity, one is apt to be disappointed. Judicial
concerns with consent and risk allocation carried out through a
facade of contractual i n t e r p r e t a t i ~ ncan
~ ~only serve to exacerbate
contractual complexity. It is one thing to acknowledge the
incentive effect of rules of interpretation which demand linguistic
p r e ~ i s i o nIt. ~is~an entirely different matter to send out a market
signal to commercial enterprises to redraft their plain English
contracts to complicate already precise language, and to include
explicit additional clauses designed to resolve anticipated
disputes. The only result will be to shift the risk expressly to the
consumer, while simultaneously reducing the over-all degree of
consumer comprehension of the contract terms due to increased
information load.
My fourth, and possibly most serious dissatisfaction with the
plain English movement derives from its apparent assumption
that the contract is a bilateral, discrete event, rather than a multilateral process. Plain English advocates apparently adhere to the
historical view of the contract as a temporally well-defined (in
fact, instantaneous) reciprocal consensual event: a meeting of the
minds.37Prior to the contract there is no legally relevant relationSee Holden, Securities for Bankers' Advances (1954), p. 186:
In view of the fact that a contract of guarantee is a relatively simple transaction, it
may be thought strange that the guarantee forms employed by the banks are such
extremely lengthy documents. Even in recent years fresh clauses have been added
to them. The highly-skilled legal advisers employed by the banks try to foresee
every possible contingency but, alas, even they are not gifted with the wisdom of
Solomon, with the result that very occasionally a guarantor is able to escape
liability. When that happens, yet another clause is added and, in this fashion, the
mesh around future guarantors is drawn tighter and tighter.
35See, for example, Wallis, Son & Wells v. Pratt & Haynes, [I9111 A.C. 394 (H.L.)
(exclusion of warranties will not exclude conditions); Webster v. Higgin, [I9481 2 All
E. R. 127 (C. A.); George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd. v . Finning Lock Seeds Ltd., supra,
footnote 33. See generally G. H. Treitel, The Law of Contract, 4th ed. (London,
Stevens & Sons, 1975), pp. 141-2; Waddams, The Law of Contracts (Toronto, Canada
Law Book Ltd., 1977), pp. 282-3.
See Procaccia, supra, footnote 27 at p. 79.
37 This approach to contract formation - the model of discrete events -has for too long
)4
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ship, and after the contract the parties' legal relationship is
unamendable except perhaps by another contract.38Accordingly,
plain English movement advocates assume that all of the information in a plain English contract must be given to the consumer at
once. H e is expected to read the document, assimilate the information, place a value on the various risks and contingencies
described in the document, assess those risks in light of risks
described in competitors' contracts, reflect on the relative value
of the risks in the context of the actual product or service being
transferred, and make a purchase decision. To describe this
"event" is to admit that it does not take place.
Decades of legal reform have been directed at an expansion of
~ 9 at
the legally relevant temporal boundaries of contract l a ~ , and
an expansion of the legally relevant parties who participate in the
process of contract formation. Some authors have advocated an
obligation of good faith bargaining in the pre-contractual phase of
sales contracts.40 "Pre-contractual" damages are recoverable in
contract,41 in recognition of the fact that complex commercial
arrangements may involve a large number of parties whose
relationships are interdependent and evolve over time. Trade
practice legislation expressly 'establishes that legally relevant
representations may occur before, at the time of, and subsequent
been the focus of classical Anglo-Canadian contract jurisprudence. See P. S. Atiyah,
The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 427. The
view corresponds, as Professor Macneil has pointed out, to neo-classical economic
analysis of exchange "in which no duties exist between the parties prior to contract
formation, and in which the duties of the parties are determined at the formation
stage": Goldberg, supra, footnote 6 at p. 49; Macneil, "The Many Futures of
Contract", 47 So. Cal. L. Rev. 69f (1974).
38 See Gilbert Steel Ltd. v. University Const. Ltd. (1976), 67 D.L.R. (3d) 606,12 O.R. (2d)
19 (C.A.).
39 AS one commentator has quite correctly expressed it, "A characteristic of certain
consumer offences is that they are complex, diffused over time and unpublicized":
Cranston, "Creeping Economism: Some Thoughts on Law and Economics", 4 Brit. J.
of L. & Soc. 103 (1977), at p. 109. See also Leff, "Injury, Ignorance and Spite -The
Dynamics of Coercive Collection", 80 Yale L.J. 1 (1970), at pp. 32-3.
Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Sale of Goods (1979), at p. 169. Labour
relations legislation has for decades recognized an obligation to bargain in good faith in
negotiating a collective agreement: the Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 228, s.
15; Labour Code, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 212, s. 63. I do not mean to say that determining
what is meant by "good faith" bargaining is a simple task. The point is simply that the
recognition of formation obligations constitutes implicit legislative acknowledgment of
the ongoing relationship in contract.
41 Anglia Television Ltd. v. Reed, [I9721 1 Q . B . 60 (C.A.); Ogus, "Note", 35 Mod. L.R.
423 (1972). See also Lloyd v. Stanbury, [I9711 1W.L.R. 535 (Ch. D.).
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to the occurrence of a consumer t r a n s a c t i ~ nAbolition
.~~
of the
par01 evidence rule in consumer transaction^,^^ increased
statutory and judicial supervision of advertising and other promo~ ~ contractual integration of point of sale
tional a ~ t i v i t i e s ,and
representation^^^ evidence a judicial and legislative awareness
that relevant information influencing transactional decisions is
received over an extended period of time, and may be disseminated by a wide range of enterprises participating in the design,
manufacture, marketing and ultimate supply of a consumer good
or service. Protection of expectations in a modern context reflects
the multilateral nature of contracts, and the temporal elasticity of
consumer decisions. Plain English contracts may, therefore,
represent a regressive development in the legal analysis of
consumer contracts. To the extent that the courts are encouraged
to focus on a bilateral relationship defined entirely by the terms
of a discrete printed document, we risk a de-emphasis of the
realities of transactional decision-making in the consumer
context.
Plain English advocates have made the point that one of the
benefits of the use of plain English contracts is that "because
consumers can read and understand plain English forms, the
forms are more likely to stand up in c0urt."~6If that is so, and one
might realistically suspect that the apparent amelioration of
procedural unfairness will engender a greater willingness to
enforce plain English contract terms, then we have created a tool
42 See Trade Practice Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406, s. 3(2).
43 The Business Practices Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 55, s. 4(7);

Trade Practice Act, supra,
footnote 42, s. 28; The Consumer Products Warranties Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. C-30, s. 9.
This approach has been advocated on a more general basis. See Law Reform
Commission of British Columbia, Report on Parol Evidence Rule (1979), at pp. 17-21;
Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Sale of Goods (1979), at p. 115.
Much of the recent trade practice legislation deals expressly with representations made
in advertising and other promotional material. See Trade Practice Act, supra, footnote
42, s. 2; the Business Practices Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 55, s. 4(9). In addition the courts
have been increasingly receptive to arguments imposing contractual liability on
manufacturers and direct suppliers of goods founded on representations contained in
"extra-contractual'' material. See Fuller v. Ford Motor Co. of Can. Ltd. (1978), 94
D.L.R. (3d) 127,22 O.R. (2d) 764 (Co. Ct.); Murray v. Sperry Rand Corp. (1979), 96
D.L.R. (3d) 113,s B.L.R. 284 (Ont. H.C.J.); Naken v. General Motors of Can. Ltd.
(1979), 92 D.L. R. (3d) 100,210.R. (2d) 780 (C.A.); Thauberger v. Simon Fraser Sales
Ltd. (1977), 3 B.C.L.R. 193 (Prov. Ct.).
45 See Consumer Protection Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 65, s. 10; The Consumer Products
Warranties Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. 30, s. 35.1 (new by S.S. 1979-80,c. 17, s. 14).
46 Black, supra, footnote 1 at p. 264.
@
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which focuses judicial attention on the discrete contract event to
the exclusion of the less visible, but certainly as relevant, extracontractual influences. If one were to rephrase the quotation
above as "because consumers [do] read and understand plain
English forms, [have a competitive variety of contract terms
available to them], [and make purchase decisions on the basis of
an inter-contract comparison of a range of consumer contracts],
the forms are more likely to stand up in court", my concern with
regression would be less valid. However, in the discussion which
follows I suggest that this revision of the quotation is entirely
unrealistic. Consumers, even if given plain English contract
forms, will behave no differently than they do when faced with
complex contract forms. If that is so, then the mere fact that they
can read and understand the terms is not especially relevant.
My point regarding the plain English movement involves an
assessment of the primary assumption upon which it is based, that
consumers will not only receive a plain English document, but
that they will also receive and process the information contained
in the document and use it in the transactional process. Mr.
Felsenfeld argues that the ultimate goal of plain English should
be to influence consumer behaviour. This assumption explains
the single most important object of the plain English movement:
to use Mr. Felsenfeld's words, "the general amelioration of
consumer contracts" ,47 thereby benefiting consumers generally,
and lessening the impact of my earlier criticism that this kind of
regulation constitutes a distribution of wealth from the many to
the few.
Research and analysis demonstrate that this goal, however
laudable, is unlikely to 'be attained. Increased disclosure of
information, even when coupled with some degree of increased
comprehension, has not apparently resulted in increased competitiveness in the distribution of sets of contractual terms. A
preliminary empirical studfa of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act carried out four years after its enactment compared pre-Act
warranty coverage with post-Act coverage across six i n d ~ s t r i e s . ~ ~
The same point has been made by others. See 119 Cong. Rec. at pp. 972-3.
See Wisdom, "An Empirical Study of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act", 31 Stan. L.
Rev. 1117 (1979). A more recent published study, which assessed warranties distributed
in 1975, demonstrated a similar narrow range of available warranties: Gerner and
Bryant, "Appliance Warranties as a Market Signal?", 15 J. of Cons. Affairs 75 (1981).
49 These were manufacturers of refrigerators, television sets, automobiles, toasters, digital
watches and tennis rackets.
47
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The data revealed that only one industry had experienced a
significant modification of its contractual warranty coverage.
Almost 80% of the contractual warranty terms were unchanged,
and the remaining demonstrated only a slight shift towards
increased coverage.50 Even if one accepts that these results are
not entirely free from uncontrolled variables, and even if one
discounts their relevance by positing that the pre-Act coverage
reflected a reasonable level of competition, they cannot be
entirely disregarded. Notwithstanding the motives of altruism
and risk of embarrassment offered by Mr. Felsenfeld as possible
explanations for higher quality contractual terms, suppliers of
contracts, even plain English contracts, need clear economic
incentives to alter their product. These market signals will only be
generated by consumers whose purchase decisions are influenced
by the information made available to them through the plain
English movement. If that does not occur, the only product of the
plain English movement will be well-drafted, simple contractual
documents which expressly allocate the risk of all major contingencies to the consumer where silence could result in enterprise
liability, which remain silent as to risks allocated by law to the
consumer, and which omit reference to minor, valueless contingencies.
The question which must be answered is whether the transactional process has been or is likely to be influenced by plain
English legislation or plain English contracts. The object of the
movement, which is to create a contractual environment in which
consumers' behavior will be modified by the information they are
receiving (and in which the information they are receiving will be
modified by their behavior) is unlikely to be achieved for several
reasons. Some of these we can do nothing about; others are
exacerbated by the existing plain English legislation described by
Mr. Felsenfeld; while still others have been left unattended to.
The foundation for my position that plain English legislation
may not have an impact on consumer transacting is quite simple.
Standard form consumer contracts may be characterized as
exercises of private legislative power.S1 As others have described
so Wisdom, supra, footnote 48 at pp. 1137-41.
51

Kessler, "Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract", 43
Col. L. Rev. 629 (1943); Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1960), pp. 362-71; Goldberg, "Institutional Change and
the Quasi-invisible Hand", 17 J. of L. & Econ. 461 (1974), at p. 484.
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it, an enforceable consumer contract entered into in a situation of
monopoly, or quasi-monopoly, or where the industry competitors
have acted in collusion in drafting the contract is simply the application of private law by one party on to another.52The consumer
is offered contractual terms on a take-it-or-leave-it basis in a
situation where no second option is available or where all competitors use the same clause. It is not the lack of bargaining which
disturbs us; that much is perfectly understandable. The costs of
negotiation, or even the anticipated costs of potential negotiation, drafting, pricing and enforcement of even a significant
percentage of uniquely tailored consumer contracts is
p r o h i b i t i ~ e .Our
~ ~ concern must be with the availability of the
alternatives to which a consumer may turn, since any definition of
non-coercive consumer contracting involves an assessment of the
existence of an opportunity to make an informed decision among
a competitive range of alternative choices.54Our analysis of the
value of the plain English movement must take into account the
likelihood that consumers will have this range of choices available
to them, will understand the particular contractual term at issue,
will make a rational decision to invest in acquiring information
about competitive terms, will be able to make a comparison
among those terms, and will be able to decide upon a particular
mix of supplier reliability, quality, quantity, price, express
contractual allocations of primary risks, and implicit contractual
allocations of primary and secondary risks. If such endeavours
were costless, if consumers were able to acquire, process,
comprehend, evaluate and act upon information about competitive contractual terms at no cost, we would not need to be
concerned with standard form contracts in their traditional form,
let alone embark upon the plain English movement. Such intercontract comparisons are not, of course, costless, and thus we
must assess whether the marginal benefits of the additional
information exceed the marginal costs of its acquisition,
processing, evaluation and c o m p a r i s ~ n . ~ ~
-

--

Gluck, "Standard Form Contracts: The Contract Theory Reconsidered", 28 Int. &
Comp. L.Q. 72 (1979), at p. 79; Slawson, "Standard Form Contracts and Democratic
Control of Law Making Power", 84 Haw. L. Rev. 529 (1971). at pp. 552-3.
53 Llewellyn, "Book Review", 52 Haw. L. Rev. 700 (1939); Posner, supra, footnote 7 at
pp. 84 et seq.
Trebilcock, supra, footnote 2 at p. 395; Gluck, supra, footnote 52 at pp. 79,80.
55 See Trebilcock, supra, footnote 2 at pp. 412-19; Schwartz and Wilde, "Intervening in
Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis", 127
U . Pa. L. Rev. 630 (1979); Landers and Rohner, supra, footnote 26 at pp. 718-19.
52

"
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We will presume that a reasonable level of competition exists in
the industry in respect of contract terms; that we are not dealing
with a monopolistic or oligopolistic industry structure; and that
competitors have not colluded in the drafting of contractual
document^.^^ But even if one presumes a competitive
environment in respect of contractual terms, the conceptual difficulty of the information presented, the information processing
capabilities of consumers, the environment in which this acquisition and processing is expected to occur and the search costs
necessary to draw relevant comparisons, all suggest that the plain
English contract as a device to "ameliorate consumer contracts"
is a misdirected endeavour.
Our object in plain English contracts is not simply to exhibit
information. We expect that information to be received,
processed and evaluated by the consumer. Research into
consumer behavior suggests that a critical variable influencing
comprehension is the conceptual difficulty of the information
p r e ~ e n t e d .It~ ~is at this point that the nature of contractual
information becomes critical. Contractual information may
describe a set of very complex facts. Very often, however, .it
describes a set of potential future facts, and establishes a second
set of absolute future facts which will flow from the first. This
second set will typically describe the legal rights of one or both of
the parties. The contractual information thus does not merely
describe facts, but rather creates law, and may involve a level of
legal complexity which may reduce comprehension to a level
below that which justifies the cost of the reform.
See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 161 A. 2d 69, 87 (N.J.S.C., 1960);
Procaccia, supra, footnote 27 at p. 93; Keeton, Insurance Law (1971), para. 2.11. The
practice of adopting industry-wide contract terms has been magnified by the recent
practice of adopting industry codes of practice. The motives for such organization may
or may not be laudable. The result may be standard form contracts which are identical
among all commercial enterprises offering the relevant goods or services within a
particular market. Lowe and Woodroffe, Consumer Law and Practice (1980), pp. 31049; Harvey, The Law of Consumer Protection and Fair Trading (1978), pp. 206-13.
Where the standard form contracts are negotiated, as is the case in England under the
Fair Trading Act 1973 (U.K.), c. 41, s. 124, then there is some assurance that the
reduction in choice may be offset by a corresponding benefit in substantive legal rights.
Where the standard form contract is simply a result of industry collusion, then the only
effect is to reduce the range of options open to consumers.
57 Davis, supra, footnote 11 at pp. 853-6.
56
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One studys8 has examined the ability of consumers to understand the following clause:
Default: I will be in default if I fail to pay an instalment on time or if I sell or
fail to take proper care of the collateral or if I move the collateral to another
location without notifying the seller.

Only 20% of the subjects correctly identified the meaning of the
clause when given the following choices:
If, through your carelessness, the refrigerator becomes damaged and the
seller finds out about it:
(a) There is nothing seller can do as long as you make your payments on
time.
(b) You will be in default, and seller may repossess the refrigerator.
( c ) Seller must permit you to have the refrigerator repaired, but if you do
so, there is nothing more the seller can do.
(d) Seller can force you to trade it in and buy another one.
(e) Don't knowlunsure.

Another less reliable study involved exposing law students to a
"readable" automobile insurance policy. The students were
requested to answer a series of simple informational questions
about the policy including the identity of the persons insured and
excluded events. None was certain about the answers, and most
could not offer unambiguous information even after re-examining
the
If we accept that the level of conceptual difficulty of
information in many consumer contracts will be no lower than
that of the default provision described above, a level of comprehension necessary to have consumer preferences revealed in a
competitive market-place is unlikely to be achieved.
An additional difficulty becomes apparent if one evaluates the
environment in which plain English contracts are presented to
consumers. Consumers' ability to process information is apt to be
directly related, at least at the outset, to the length of time during
which they are able to consider the information. Plain English
contracts are likely to be presented to consumers no earlier in the
contracting process than were traditional contractual documents.
In addition, the information is presented to the consumer in an
environment created by the supplier; distractions may range from
non-contractual promotional material and the "good" itself, to
background sales pitches by the supplier and his agents. More
58 Ibid., at p. 879.
59 Procaccia, supra, footnote

27 at p. 83.
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importantly, the plain English contract is apt to be presented
after the agreement has been concluded. Thus in the case of a
collateral promissory note to secure a consumer sales transaction,
the consumer would have psychologically committed himself to
the purchase, the price of the good, the price of the loan and
perhaps the magnitude of the periodic loan payments. Disclosure
of the contract terms under the plain English contract takes place
after this non-legal commitment has occurred, with the result that
search costs necessary to an effective inter-contract comparison
of the terms are far less likely to be incurred. Thus plain English
contracts, which allegedly are designed to influence transactional
behavior, would be employed in such a way as to transfer information when it is least likely to influence behavior.60
This phenomenon is simply a manifestation of the behavioral
perspective described earlier under which transactions are viewed
as discrete events rather than processes. If one considers that
purchase decisions are made over time, then the search costs as to
the expected kind and value of contractual terms will be incurred
(if at all) to acquire pre-contract information on an informal basis
from advertisements, popular knowledge of commercial reputation, and perhaps from organizations which produce intercontract comparisons of contract goods.61 There is a significant
risk that this information will come to be considered less relevant
in a legal evaluation of contractual relationships which are
consummated by clearly written, readable, plain English
contracts.
Even if we were to assume an adequate level of comprehension, a consumer must still face the formidable task of assessing
the value, at least on a relative basis, of the contractual allocation
of risk.62 This valuation should involve, at the very least, an
evaluation of the likelihood of the risk occurring, an attempt to
estimate the financial loss likely to occur as a result,63 and a
forecast of the time when the risk will occur in order to arrive at
an appropriate time discount factor. Not all of this information
can be conveyed in the contract itself; some of the variables will
60 Landers and Rohner, supra, footnote 26 at pp. 715-16.
6' See text at footnote 7.
62 See Trebilcock, supra, footnote 2 at p. 417.
63 Even to know that the kind of loss for which recovery

is possible is limited to those
"likely" to occur presumes that the consumer has digested both historical and more
recent decisions defining "remoteness" in contract law.
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be idiosyncratic, while the occurrence of the risk may depend on
deliberate choice as well as unforeseen events.
Equally relevant is the difficulty of evaluating these cost factors
in light of the "unfeasibility of numerical corn par is on^"^^ of low
risk contingencies. The entire process may be worthless. One
analyst apparently has concluded that the contractual default
packages on a $1,300 loan must be perceived to vary by at least
$850, in order to make it rational for the consumer to agree to an
additional one percent annual rate of interest on the loan.65This
analysis is further reinforced by the argument that consumers
~~
may misperceive the costs of low risk c ~ n t i n g e n c i e s ,leading
them to focus on the major element of the transaction -price and the physical attributes of the consumer good. The result may
be that plain English contracts, like contracts in general, may
suffer from an over-emphasis on price, the major component of
the transaction, and a complementary under-appreciation of the
contractual risk contingencies, the classical harsh-terms-low-price
~ombination.~'
Once this valuation has been done for one contract term, it
must be done for all others (since we have assumed that only
major contingencies are included in plain English contracts) and
as well for major contingencies which are not expressly allocated
under the contract. The consumer must then engage in the evaluation process, assuming it can be carried out accurately, for a
reasonable cross-section of alternative contract formulations to
arrive at an inter-contractual comparison of the relative value of
the mixes of contractual terms available to him. The processing
costs alone are likely to render any benefit from the task irrelevant.
To these processing costs we must add search costs. At the very
least the consumer must invest some time, effort, and perhaps
money in acquiring information about these alternative contract
formulations. The ability to compare alternative mixes of
contract terms as a pre-condition to effective participation is
made all the more difficult if one adopts, as a premise of the plain
a Landers and Rohner, supra, footnote 26 at p. 728.
65 Zbid., at pp. 729-30.
&See Tversky and Kahneman, "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases",
185 Science 1124 (1974); MacKaay, supra, footnote 32 at pp. 128-9; Hirshhorn, supra,
footnote 7 at p. 5.
6' Goldberg, supra, footnote 51 at p. 486.
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English movement, an approach which favours flexibility,
innovation and experimentation in language, format, style and
structure. The approach advocated by Mr. Felsenfeld - that
plain English draftsmen be permitted to work in freedom - can
only result in a variety of contractual provisions relating to the
same risk, which are so phrased as to make each of them when
viewed alone as reasonably clear, but which effectively preclude,
or at least make prohibitively expensive, meaningful intercontractual comparisons. Standardization of terminology will
reduce these transaction costs, while individual freedom of
artistic and linguistic expression may reduce the ability of
consumers to process comparative contractual information. A
sophisticated analysis of plain English contracts, and of consumer
decision-making, suggests that standard comparative data
describing and evaluating contract terms may be preferable to
plain English contracts as a technique for facilitating and
reinforcing consumer decision-making.6*
Advocates of plain English legislation may respond to these
criticisms by pointing to the existence of market competition; not
all consumers need react to certain price-quality combinations in
order to influence sellers to offer competitive contract terms.
Rather, as Posner,Trebilcock and others have put it, suppliers of
contract terms will have to arrange a mix of price and non-price
terms attractive enough to prevent consumers at the margin from
switching their business to another supplier.69Thus we need not
concern ourselves with the multitude of consumers who may
exhibit amotivational tendencies, who lack the ability to
See text at footnote 7. Cranston, supra, footnote 39 at p. 109; Leff, supra, footnote 39 at
p. 33. One author has suggested that consumer decision-making may be improved by
establishing an "information environment" which will permit comparative data on
products (and one presumes, on contract terms) to be used by consumers most effectively. See Bettman, "Issues in Designing Consumer Information Environments",
[I9751 J. of Cons. Res. 169; Bettman and Zinis, "Information Format and Choice Task
Effects in Decision Making", [I9791 J. of Cons. Res. 141. Recent evidence suggests that
consumers prefer comparative standard information to improve prepurchase information. See Claxton and Ritchie, Consumers' Perceptions of Prepurchase Shopping
Problems and Solutions: Major Problems and Solutions (Consumer Research and
Evaluation Branch, Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, 1981), p. 31. Standardization of form was one of the primary objectives of the Truth in Lending Legislation.
See Landers, "Some Reflections on Truth in Lending", U. Ill. L.F. 669 (1977), at pp.
684-7.
69Trebilcock, supra, footnote 2 at p. 399; Posner, supra, footnote 7 at pp. 84-8;
Kornhauser, "Unconscionability in Standard Forms", 64 Cal. L. Rev. 1151 (1976);
Goldberg, supra, footnote 51 at p. 485.
68
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comprehend and evaluate contract terms, or who cannot afford
the search costs to engage in inter-contractual comparisons of
non-price terms. Rather, if plain English legislation increases
information acquisition to some degree, and if elimination of
express allocation of low risk contingencies reduces the distortion
in assessing the value of contract terms, we might perceive a
thickening "of the margin of sophisticated consumers whose
actions 'make' the market."70
Unfortunately, this analysis suffers from two serious shortcomings. The first is that the movement of consumers away from a
supplier presumes an element of knowledge of the product's
undesired characteristics. What was or was not a rational
purchase decision in respect of a contractual term may not be
discovered for a considerable length of time in the case of some
long term consumer contracts. Even if an event does occur, is the
loss due to non-compensation by the other contracting party
related to the price paid by the consumer, the reliability of the
commercial supplier, the failure to take out insurance, or to the
misallocation of risk? In many cases the contingency may never
arise, and where things are apparently working out, it is next to
impossible to assume that a consumer will be driven to conclude
that a paid for allocation of risk to the seller was not worth the
cost. In other words, participation in the market-place may not
generate information about the product. Theoretically, when a
consumer purchases a particular mix of contract terms on a
regular basis he may discover that his perceptions of the value of
the particular mix was not accurate. Not only may the imperfection not be discovered (or if discovered, improperly ascribed),
the effective ability of even a sophisticated consumer to signal his
supplier that he prefers an alternate mix of terms is certainly
subject to the same constraints as was the original contract
70 Trebilcock,

supra, footnote 2 at p. 418; Schwartz, "Sellers Unequal Bargaining Power
and the Judicial Process", 49 Ind. L.J. 367 (1974); Schwartz, "A Re-examination of
Non-substantive Unconscionability", 63 Va. L. Rev. 1053 (1978); MacKaay, supra,
footnote 32 at pp. 133-4. The sophisticated consumer whose behavior may be influenced
by increased access to information, may be joined by consumer "agents", who
"negotiate" standard form contracts with commercial enterprises. See A. Schroeder
Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Macaulay, [I9741 1 W.L.R. 1308 (H.L.), at p. 1316 per
Lord Diplock; Green Ltd. v. Cade Bros. Farms, [I9781 1 Lloyd's L. Rep. 602 as noted
by Ziegel in 57 Can. Bar Rev. 105 (1979). This form of standard form contract negotiation has been institutionalized in England under the Fair Trading Act 1973 (U.K.), c.
41, s. 124(3).
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decision. Indeed the switch may be less likely to occur in light of
the sunk investment of time, money and effort presumably undertaken as a prerequisite to the original, sophisticated, ultimately
unsatisfactory decision.
The analysis of the marginal consumer may also be misleading
in so far as it presumes that all consumers will be treated alike. As
we saw earlier, it may be that different markets in contract terms
exist for different classes of consumers. Suppliers may "contract
term discriminate" by agreeing to renegotiate the mix of contract
terms for the aggressive bargain-seeking, sophisticated consumer
while retaining the prohibitive search and processing costs of
inter-contract comparisons for others.'l All plain English
contracts may do is to increase the numbers of the elite
information-seeking consumers who know enough to be bought
off. 72
For the majority of consumers, plain language contracts may
simply make us feel better. Feeling better may be valuable,
indeed that may be all that we are paying for in contracting for
consumer goods. If that is so, then it makes little difference if we
derive pleasure from the good or the contract language. And if
feeling better is worth the price, then the transaction - the
purchase of the psychological satisfaction of believing that we
know what we are doing - may be efficient. Yet there are two
unanswered questions. The first involves the proposition that
plain language contracts may increase contractual distortions.
Trebilcock has argued that consumers attach a price to uncertainty and lack of information by discounting the consideration
It is remarkable that so little empirical data has been collected on this critical issue. See
Mueller, "Residential Tenants and Their Leases: An Empirical Study", 69 Mich. L.
Rev. 247 (1970).
72 It is true, of course, that the use of plain English contracts may create some offsetting
benefits. There is some evidence that consumer understanding may, in fact, improve
where simplified documents are used. Davis, supra, footnote 11 at p. 896. In addition,
even if consumers do not use the information in transacting, the incidence of contractual
defaults may decrease if consumers are made aware, even after contracting, of the legal
consequences of certain behaviour. Similarly, contract terms requiring action once a
certain event has occurred (such as a term requiring notification of an insurance loss
within a prescribed time) may be adhered to with greater frequency where consumers
are able to understand terms once a loss has taken place. Finally, the inequality of
wealth and knowledge between commercial enterprises and consumers brought about
by the formers' accessibility to legal advice, familiarity with contract terms, and
expected return on legal investments may be reduced, if the contract terms are comprehensible to a non-expert when a dispute has arisen as to compliance with the contract.
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they are prepared to pay for entering into undetermined, but
intuitively adverse risk allocation arrangement^.'^ The misperception that consumers may have that they do understand the
plain English terms offered to them may operate to reduce that
discount, and thus exacerbate the consumers' misallocations of
resources. The second point involves an intuitive dissatisfaction
with the morality of selling only happiness. One must always face
the question as to whether consumers would, with full knowledge
of the game, agree to it.

